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Taking Care of the Future? 
The complex responsibility of education & politics 
Deborah Osberg 
In one way or another, all the essays in this volume address the question of how it 
is possible to take up an affirmative orientation to the future when, as Paul Cilliers 
writes in the foreword to this volume, “we have to make choices which cannot be 
reduced to calculation alone.” If we care about the future, it matters very much that 
we do the “right” thing… it is important that we act in a way that will indeed 
positively influence the future, rather than that we act in a way that will have a 
negative effect or that we refrain from acting at all (which is nevertheless still 
taking a position that can have a negative effect). But if we can no longer know, in 
rational or calculable terms, what the “right” thing may be, then how should we 
act? What should we do? Under these conditions what is the meaning of 
normativity? How do we make sense of “should”? In this final essay I argue for the 
necessity to engage, in complex terms, with the question of how it is possible to 
adopt an affirmative orientation to the future. I use the politically and ethically 
problematic notion of “care” as a “springboard” for this discussion precisely 
because it appears to me to “take place” at the “interface” between complexity 
theory, political theory and ethical theory.  
 In complexity terms the notion of care can be interpreted as that “Prigoginian 
moment of freedom” in a complex process when the system is destabilised to the 
point of bifurcation.  At this point the system is faced with an undecidable choice 
between several equally possible “ways forward” and must “choose” (Prigogine, 
1997, p.68) one of the possible branches available. Since the “decisions” that take 
place at such moments influence the future states of the system, these “decisions” 
can be said to be significant or meaningful in the “life” of the system. Note that 
meaning, here, arises as a consequence of choice/freedom—which is given 
ontological status—rather than being something that is already present to guide 
choice. Since it matters to the system which of the available branches is chosen, the 
“Prigoginian moment of freedom” within which such a choice takes place, can be 
interpreted also as a “moment of care.” The meaning of “care” in this context is 
close to the meaning of Sorge (care) in Heidegger’s Being and Time (see 
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Sandbothe, 2001, for a detailed discussion of the resonances between the thought 
of Prigogine and Heidegger).  
 In ethical terms the notion of care has been given a central place in both the 
feminist “ethics of care” (see e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1986; Held, 2006) 
and Hans Jonas’s “ethics of responsibility for the future” (Jonas, 1984). There have 
also been attempts to extract an ethics from Heidegger’s notion of Sorge (see, e.g., 
Miyasaki, 2007; Olafson, 1998; Guignon, 1993) although it is also argued that no 
such ethics can be derived from this concept (see Paley, 2000; Horrocks, 2004). 
Aristotle, too, has been described as an early advocate of an ethics of care (e.g., 
Curzer, 2007) and even Kant’s ethics, which is usually framed in opposition to the 
ethics of care, has more recently been described as an ethics of care (see Paley, 
2002). Derrida’s work on the concept of justice (which is normally opposed to the 
concept of care) has also been framed in terms of care (Campolo, 1985). 
 In contrast to its enthusiastic (but also contentious) embrace by ethical theory, 
the notion of care has a rather prickly relationship with politics. Nevertheless, there 
is certainly no shortage of engagement with this concept in political theory. In 
political terms, care is generally discussed as a form of power and either opposed 
to Foucault’s ethics of freedom, which specifically opposes the shared human 
essence implied by the feminist “ethics of care” (see, e.g., Sybylla, 2001; Deveaux, 
1995) or used to outline a new form of political theory (see, e.g., Engster, 2004; 
2009). At the least some authors have tried to reposition the feminist ethics of  care 
in more political terms (Tronto 1993; 1996; Held, 2006). The main political 
difficulty with the notion of care is that it seems always to imply a teleological or 
ends-driven understanding of action which requires that we know in advance what 
it is we are supposed to be doing to act in an ethical manner. This positions the 
notion of care firmly in the arena of normative ethics, which is a specific target of 
critique in political theory.  
 What is of particular importance and interest for the purposes of this essay, is 
that a teleological or ends-driven understanding of action can be shown, without 
exception, to be underpinned by an instrumental logic which relies absolutely on 
the idea of rationally informed choice. If we can no longer rely on rationally 
informed choice to make “caring” decisions about the future—because our 
decisions cannot be reduced to calculation alone—this has tremendous implications 
not only for normative ethical and political theory, but also for normative 
education, and indeed for any practice that directs itself towards some 
preconceived notion of “good.”  
 The problem that complexity theory raises for the notion of care does not relieve 
us of responsibility to “take care of the future.” It suggests, rather, that it is 
necessary to engage with this responsibility in a different way. It is necessary to 
engage with it in complex and open-ended terms rather than only in instrumental 
and teleological terms. This, however, is a rather paradoxical assignment. The task 
of this essay is to explore the dimensions of this paradox with a view to 
understanding what an affirmative orientation towards the future might mean for 
education and politics in the absence of a teleological theory of action. 
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 The ethics of Hans Jonas provides a useful entry point for this discussion as it 
provides an initial framework within which concepts such as freedom, care, 
knowledge, power, responsibility and futurity—these being the main themes of this 
essay—are placed in relation to each other in the context of ethics. Even although 
Jonas’s ethics is normatively grounded and hence teleological, his positioning of 
these concepts relative to each other provides a clear articulation of the paradoxical 
nature of the assignment to take care of the future. It is necessary to enter this 
paradox in order to do justice to the question of what a non-teleological but 
affirmative orientation to the future might mean. 
Taking Care of the Future. A Paradoxical Assignment 
In The Imperative of Responsibility, Jonas (1984) develops an ethics in which the 
notion of responsibility assumes a central position. This ethical theory is an 
extension of his “philosophy of life” (Jonas 1966), which gives the notion of 
freedom (and by implication value and meaning) ontological status in the 
organisation of all organic life (not only human life). In this regard, Jonas’s 
philosophy of life has much in common with Prigogine’s ontological positioning of 
freedom within the structure of matter (although Prigogine extends freedom to the 
inorganic world as well). Jonas argues that without freedom, life would not be 
possible. To elaborate on this a little, Jonas defines life as an active resistance of 
death (which will inevitably engulf it) or, as a striving to build and perpetuate a 
self-distinct physical unity (organisation) which is committed to maintaining its 
independence from the equalising physical forces of the non-living world. The 
problem, however, as Jonas points out, is that “[t]he privilege of freedom carries 
the burden of need” as the privilege emerges from the paradoxical fact that living 
substance has segregated itself “from the very matter which is yet indispensible to 
its being” (1966, p. 4). To maintain its being, and its freedom, 
the living form must have matter at its disposal, and it finds it outside itself, 
in the foreign ‘world’ … Its want goes out to where its means of satisfaction 
lie: its self-concern, active in the acquisition of new matter, is essential 
openness for the encounter with outer being” (1966, p. 84, my emphasis).  
I remain alive “by the effort I must make to overcome the resistance of worldly 
matter in my acting and to resist the impact of worldly matter upon myself” (ibid., 
p. 23, emphasis original). In this sense, Jonas is arguing that value-imbued 
purposiveness is necessary in order for life to exist. It is the condition of possibility 
of life. Without the possibility of purposeful choice, life is unable to “resist the 
impact of worldly matter” upon its being. It dies. It is upon this “precarious, 
vulnerable, and revocative character, the peculiar mode of transience of all life” 
(1984, p. 98) that Jonas begins to build an ethics in which the notion of 
responsibility assumes a central position. 
 To develop this ethics, Jonas begins by distinguishing quite sharply between 
what he calls formal responsibility, and substantive responsibility. Jonas describes 
formal responsibility as “retroactive” in that it is a form of causal power that is 
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attributed after the fact. This form of responsibility renders an agent responsible for 
deeds done regardless of the content of such deeds. Whether the effects of such 
deeds are positive or negative, we are responsible anyway. This kind of 
responsibility is “the mere formal burden of all causal acting” (1984, p. 92). Jonas 
is not that concerned, however, with this “empty” form of responsibility. He 
focuses his attention, instead, on substantive responsibility which he analyses as a 
future orientated form of responsibility.  
 Jonas describes substantive responsibility as taking the form of being committed 
in advance to carrying out particular deeds that will affect the future. In this case 
the content—or substance—of the deeds done does mater. In this sense 
responsibility is assigned before rather than after the fact and Jonas describes it as a 
form of power that “obligates [an agent] to actions not otherwise contemplated at 
all” (ibid., my emphasis). It is “the forward determination of what is to be done” 
(1984, p. 92). Jonas argues that this future orientated facing or substantive form of 
responsibility applies only to life itself because  
what time cannot affect and to which nothing can happen is an object not of 
responsibility but of emulation. The eternal has no need for the former. … 
Only for the changeable and perishable can one be responsible, for what is 
threatened by corruption, for the mortal in its mortality. (ibid., pp. 125-126) 
In this sense, responsibility implies a commitment to ensuring the ongoing 
existence or at least the quality of existence of other living beings. It is a form of 
care for the transient and perishable. This form of responsibility, as Jonas points 
out, is a “nonreciprocal relation of power” (ibid., p. 94). 
The well-being, the interest, the fate of others has, by circumstance or 
agreement, come under my care, which means that my control over it, 
involves at the same time my obligation for it. … A distinct disparity of 
power or competence belongs to this relationship. (ibid., p. 93. emphasis 
original) 
In the human realm, Jonas suggests that the “natural responsibility” of parents for 
children and the “freely-chosen responsibility” of the statesman for the common 
cause blend into an “integral and paradigmatic representation of the primordial 
phenomenon of responsibility” (1984, p. 98). In both examples responsibility exists 
as a definable, nonreciprocal relation of power. Indeed, Jonas argues that 
“substantive” responsibility cannot be understood outside of unequal power 
relations because if we have no power to affect the object of our responsibility, it 
cannot command us to act in its interests. Substantive responsibility is therefore 
inseparably linked to the power we have over the object of our responsibility. Such 
power derives, at least in part, from knowledge for we can only act in the interests 
of the object of our responsibility—i.e., ensure its preservation or care—when we 
have sufficient knowledge and understanding of what it is that may facilitate its 
ongoing well-being. To be responsible, in this sense, is to act in accordance with 
our knowledge and beliefs about the needs of our charge. Under these conditions, 
this form of responsibility is inherently normative. Knowledge informs us of how 
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we ought to act to bring about those outcomes we believe should occur. For this 
reason Jonas insists that substantive responsibility is “a function of power and 
knowledge” (1984, p. 123). 
In as much as it is concerned with an obligation to the well-being and care of 
others, Jonas’s conceptualisation of responsibility might be equated with the 
feminist ethics of care which began to appear in the English speaking world (e.g., 
Gilligan, 1982) at the same time as Jonas was developing his ethics of 
responsibility (the Imperative of Responsibility was originally published in two 
parts in German in 1979 and 1981). There are however, some important differences 
between these two ethical positions. 
While both ethical positions are concerned with the affirmation of life, the 
understanding of what constitutes “life” is fundamentally different. Jonas draws on 
an understanding of life as purposiveness itself (in contrast to the more usual 
understanding of life as preceding purpose: that is, life must first be “there” before 
it can “have” a purpose). For Jonas, since life is already purposive, it is also 
already value-laden which means “care” is always already present. 
This is not so for feminist care theorists who, for the most part, posit care as 
something that is initially in deficit and which must therefore be cultivated if we 
are to become ethical. In other words, for feminist care theorists, care is the end 
point of ethics, whereas for Jonas it is already there at the start. What this means is 
that the primary focus of the feminist ethics of care is the specification of what it 
means to “be caring.” Although there is some disagreement amongst care theorists 
about what, precisely, constitutes “care,” such definitions generally include 
“feminine” qualities such as attentiveness to need, responsiveness, trust (Held, 
2006), understanding, relatedness (Tronto, 1993); “absorption” in the other 
(Noddings, 1986) and so on. These qualities are then posited as ethical aims—
specifications of how we should act in relation to others—which implies that forms 
of action such as “distancing,”  “justice” and “rationality,” that do not include some 
level of “feminine care” are somehow ethically inadequate.  
 Jonas makes no such claims about what, precisely, constitutes a “caring” action 
for he does not posit care as the end point of ethics. He posits care at the very 
beginning of the ethical process; as the condition of possibility of responsibility, 
and responsibility as the obligation to act in the interests of another. Jonas does not 
specify precisely what kind of action we should perform in order to act in the 
interests of another. He suggests only that ethics becomes possible when we are 
called to act in the interests of others over whom we have power. For Jonas 
ethics is for the ordering of actions and for regulating the power to act. It 
must be there all the more, then, the greater the powers of acting that are to be 
regulated; and as it must fit their size, the ordering principle must also fit 
their kind. Thus, novel powers to act require novel ethical rules and perhaps 
even a new ethics. (1984, p. 23) 
But Jonas’s ethics of responsibility can also be differentiated from the feminist 
ethics of care in another sense (although not unrelated to the above); one which is 
perhaps more pertinent for the purposes of this essay.  
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 Jonas (1984) argues that we are now at a point in history where modern 
technology has so enhanced human power that the scope of present-day action 
reaches far beyond our own contemporaries. We now have power “over matter, 
over life on earth, and over man himself; and [our power] keeps growing at an 
accelerating pace” (ibid., p. ix). As a result, an ethics concerned with “doing right 
what [has] to be done now” (ibid., p. 123, my emphasis), which has been the focus 
of all previous ethics (with the exception of Marxist ethics) is no longer sufficient. 
He argues that what is needed today is “an ethics of responsibility for and to a 
distant future” (ibid., p. 22) which he also refers to as an ethics of “responsibility 
for the coming” (ibid., p. 124).  
While Jonas acknowledge that this ethics has some similarities with Marxism, 
which is also concerned with the distant future, he also sharply differentiates his 
ethics from Marxism by arguing that his imperative of responsibility is open ended 
in contrast with the Marxist imperative which is concerned with final ends, or 
Utopia. For Jonas, responsibility for the future is an obligation or duty that has no 
terminus. It is responsibility for life itself “in its ever-new, always unprecedented 
productions, which no knowledge of essence can predict” (1984, p. 126). Jonas 
wants to ensure that there will be a future in which life is still possible. It is this 
new ethics of responsibility for and to the interests of a distant future, that presents 
Jonas with the paradox that will be addressed in the reminder of this essay. The 
difficulty or paradox is that of how one can be obligated to the distant future when 
… only present interests make themselves heard and felt and enforce their 
consideration. . . . But the future is not represented, it is not a force that can 
throw its weight into the scales. The nonexistent has no lobby, and the unborn 
are powerless. Thus accountability to them has no political reality behind it in 
present decision-making, and when they can make their complaint, then we, 
the culprits, will no longer be there. (1984, p. 22, emphasis original). 
 If we take seriously that we cannot know in advance what the future will be like 
then we also cannot know in advance (even in principle) what its “needs” will be. 
And if we cannot know what the needs of the future will be, then we cannot act in a 
way calculated to meet those needs.  How, then can we “take care” of a future that 
is radically open? It is to this question I turn next. 
Taking Care of the Future by Controlling It 
In their book Breakpoint and Beyond: Mastering the Future (1992) George Land 
and Beth Jarman suggest that one way of “taking care of the future”—in the face of 
radical uncertainty about it—is to act in a way that we think will meet the needs of 
an imagined future. We can, in other words, imagine what a “good” or “healthy” 
future will look like, and then act in a way calculated to facilitate or bring about 
this ideal. Such imaginings form the basis of what they describe as a “Creative 
Worldview” (p. 98) approach to vision, strategy and planning where the future is 
“channelled” (my word) in the direction imagined for it through attempts 
calculated to engineer a preferred future. This not only decreases the uncertainty of 
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the future but also attempts to ensure that a certain kind of future takes place. It can 
be argued that to not try to influence the future in this way—to not care enough 
about what happens—is tantamount to neglect. Steering the future towards a 
preferred state enables humankind to take control of their own destiny rather than 
leaving it to the vicissitudes of fate. In this sense caring for the future is an 
important form of  human agency. 
 Land and Jarman argue that to channel the future in this way it is first necessary 
to develop a shared vision of the future. Although Land and Jarman argue that no-
one with a compelling purpose and great vision knows exactly how that vision will 
be achieved it is nevertheless achieved as the focus produces a certain sensitivity to 
opportunities presented. This enables people to make the most of surprise, 
serendipity, and the unexpected. Once such a vision for the future is established it 
acts as an “invisible magnet” (1992, p. 109) pulling the present towards itself. They 
give the example of John F. Kennedy holding out the vision of landing a man on 
the moon which, so they argue, inspired an entire nation to develop the 
technological capability for manned space flights (ibid., p. 176). Land & Jarman 
argue that that a compelling shared purpose energises life. Purpose extracts the 
most important bits from the background noise and focuses us on something clear.  
 In his book Emergence (1998), John Holland describes much the same process 
of complexity reduction taking place when we develop scientific models and 
theories. He suggests that making a “well conceived” model means (simply) 
“extract[ing] the regularities from incidental and irrelevant details” (Holland, 1998, 
p. 4). In his words: “Shearing away detail is the very essence of [scientific] model 
building. Whatever else we require, a model must be simpler than the thing 
modelled” (Holland, 1998, p. 24).  
 For Land & Jarman as well as for Holland it is only by reducing the complexity 
of the present, by sorting the “important” bits from the “noise” and in this way 
controlling what does (or can) and does not (or cannot) take place, that we are able 
to guide the future towards a shared vision: some predetermined or “preferred” 
state that we envision for it.  
 Regardless of how morally motivated this attitude towards the future may be, it 
completely fails to address the ethico-political problem that arises whenever 
attempts are made to control the future in this way. George Orwell’s futuristic 
novel Nineteen eighty-four exemplifies the potential harm in this kind of imagining 
(“coincidentally,” this date, 1984, is the date Jonas’s Imperative of Responsibility 
appeared for the first time in English). Orwell meant it to draw out the logical 
implications of what can happen when we extend the ideas of the ruling class 
ideology into the future (see Shklar, 1985, for an extended discussion on this). The 
problem is, and always has been: who is and who is not included in the “we” that 
decides what the future will be like? This is the central problem of political 
decision making.  How then is politics supposed to deal with this?  
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Who Controls the Future? Politics and the Question of Freedom 
Within the realm of the political, ethical questions will always arise about which or 
whose desired future we should be caring about and hence trying to bring into 
existence. The idea of democracy suggests that it is possible, somehow, to resolve 
such questions through structured forms of joint decision making. However, no 
matter whether we arrive at such decisions (about which preferred future should be 
actively pursued) through (i) a populist model (where elected officials enact or 
incite mass preferences), (ii) a deliberative model (where decisions are arrived at 
through rational, deliberative debate about different preferences) or (iii), a pluralist 
model (where the preferences chosen are the result of a struggle amongst organised 
interests), or any other so-called democratic form of decision making, it is always 
the case that the decisions that are made—indeed must be made—could always 
have been other than they were. Other decisions could have been made. The very 
fact that a decision can be made in the first place—i.e., that there is a choice 
between alternatives—implies that the alternatives are real alternatives: they are in 
fact undecidable, in a Prigoginian sense. Derrida (1992) articulates the 
undecidability of decisions quite succinctly in the following remark 
When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the 
way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said there is 
none to make. (1992, p. 41) 
If the way is clear from the outset, there is no freedom as there is no necessity for a 
decision. In political decision making, what this means is that there is no rational 
ground for choosing one way forward above another. Nevertheless we have to 
choose because we cannot go in two directions at the same time. When freedom is 
understood in a Prigoginian and Derridean sense (as a bifurcation or moment of 
undecidability) then political decision making, as Rancière (2010) has argued, is a 
mode of action that takes the form of dissensus rather than consensus. Political 
decisions necessarily exclude and divide. For Rancière, there is no possibility to 
remove dissensus from politics (even “democratic politics) because dissensus—the 
idea that there is no rational ground for political decision making—is the very 
structure or ground of politics itself.  
The core of the problem, as I see it, is that democracy is neither a form of 
government nor a form of social life. Democracy is the institution of politics 
as such, of politics as paradox. Why a paradox? Because … the very ground 
for the power of ruling is that there is no ground at all. (Rancière, 2010, p. 50, 
my emphasis) 
[Democracy] is a supplementary, or grounding, power that at once legitimises 
and de-legitimises every set of institutions or the power of any one set of 
people.” (ibid., p. 52).  
 For Rancière, freedom (in a Derridean/Prigonian sense) is the condition of 
possibility of democracy, not its end. As this kind of freedom opens the possibility 
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of alternate futures, political decision-making itself can be understood as a 
necessarily normative act because such decisions can usher people in only one of 
these alternate directions. As we cannot move in all directions at once, political 
decisions have the effect of reducing the complexity of the present by channelling 
the present in a particular direction. Politics is normative precisely because it 
cannot avoid deciding on one way forward, which necessarily closes other ways 
forward. 
 Since political decisions cannot take place without a certain degree justification 
(even though there are no rational grounds for choosing one justification above 
another), and since such justification entails a degree of representation which is a 
form of envisioning, we must concede that deciding on a particular way forward 
entails a certain amount of envisioning, of precisely the type that Land and Jarman 
(1992) uphold. However we arrive our vision, such vision appears to be necessary 
for political action. As Rancière remarks 
The essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to 
make the world of its subjects and its operations seen. (2010, p. 37)  
But this does not mean any vision will suffice. It means, instead, that because the 
adoption of a particular framework or vision can never be justified absolutely 
(there are no rational grounds for such justification), that we cannot take any of our 
visions for granted. We cannot enter into political decision making (which is 
always a form of complexity reduction) with certainty.  
 Understanding that politics is always a form of complexity reduction which 
distributes power in particular (unequal) ways no matter how we arrange the 
system, means we can begin to think of the political as a space which necessitates 
unremitting critical reflexivity towards our own political decisions (or visions) and 
practice/s (Amin & Thrift, 2005; Mouffe, 2005). But that is not the end of the story 
as politics entails more than simply the endless redistribution of power within an 
economy of the same, which is an economy of the past. Politics is also about 
envisioning better ways of doing things than are currently in the world. That is, it 
also attempts to take up an affirmative orientation to the future. This brings me to 
the final (for this essay) way of “taking care of the future.”  
Taking Care of the Future by Experimenting with It 
What is important about Rancière’s understanding of democracy as beginning with 
freedom (rather than making freedom the goal, as is the case with liberal 
democracy), is that it allows us to see that if we keep freedom open, politics (or 
democracy) remains possible. When freedom is no longer there, politics (the 
possibility for alternate futures) is no longer possible. With Rancière’s politics, the 
long-term future is radically open because as long as freedom is there, it is possible 
to imagine and pursue alternate futures.  
 This, however, does not change the fact that the futures we pursue through the 
decisions we make are envisioned futures. That is, they are instrumental, 
normative, and take up a fundamentally dominating attitude toward the future. Any 
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envisioning, no matter how short term or revocable, is an attempt to control the 
future because it installs a telos which instrumentalises our actions. For this reason 
it could be argued that merely keeping open the possibility for different visions for 
the future is insufficient as a basis for claiming responsibility for the future because 
it still does not allow the future to speak for itself. Installing a vision is a form of 
denial of the unknown, or incalculable, and hence a denial of the future in its 
radical futurity. Since we cannot take a position of responsibility and care towards 
something whose existence we deny, such an attitude towards the future can still be 
considered to be irresponsible or uncaring. As Derrida points out, 
when a responsibility is exercised in the order of the possible, it simply 
follows a direction and elaborates a programme. It makes of action the 
applied consequence, the simple application of a knowledge or know-how. It 
makes of ethics and politics a technology. No longer of the order of practical 
reason, it begins to be irresponsible. (1992, p. 45) 
It may be, however, that with political decisions we can do no else. As I have 
already mentioned, politics is normative precisely because it cannot avoid deciding 
on one way forward, which necessarily closes other ways forward. If this is the 
case then something else is also required if we are to be responsible for the radical 
alterity of the future. 
 This “something else” is explored in different ways in the political theory of 
Rancière, Mouffe, Badiou, Arendt, Agamben, Derrida and others. The basic idea is 
that “envisioning the future” does not necessarily have to be constructed wholly 
within the economy of the past. When we project the “good” ideas of the past 
forward, in an attempt to control the shape of future, we cannot escape the political 
impasse that arises when we try to decide whose “good ideas” are the “best.” The 
spectre of Orwell’s Nineteen eighty-four provides a warning about this kind of 
projection.  
 A different kind of envisioning is required. An envisioning of the type that 
somehow enables “the voice of the future” to manifest  (although the future can 
never speak entirely in its own voice). This kind of envisioning can emerge from 
sensitive and tentative experimentation with what is not yet possible. I believe 
Derrida provides the most concise articulation of this idea in the following 
statement (an extension of the quote given earlier):  
When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the 
way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said there is 
none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or 
implements a programme. Perhaps, and this would be the objection, one 
never escapes the programme. In that case, one must acknowledge this and 
stop talking with authority about moral or political responsibility. The 
condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain 
experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible; the testing of 
the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the 
impossible invention. (1992, p. 41, my emphasis, original emphasis removed) 
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 Derrida, as I have explained elsewhere (Osberg & Biesta, 2007), is working, so I 
believe, with a “logic” of emergence which, in many respects can be considered to 
be a “deconstructive logic.” This “logic” can never be formalised because its 
movement unpicks its grounds. Every time it “looks back” at itself (to formalise 
itself) the very process of looking back has moved it forwards so that it is no longer 
explainable in terms of what it was. Derrida’s deconstruction—which I would 
speak of as the “logic” of emergence, takes the form of a contradiction or paradox. 
Derrida enters the paradox itself—the Prigonian bifurcation or “moment of 
freedom” which is a moment of undecidability—and there finds a form of 
responsibility that is justice as well as care for the future. 
 Derrida’s work suggests that to act responsibly towards an incalculable future—
to care enough to do justice to the future—it is first necessary to take seriously the 
incalculability of the future. Taking the incalculability of the future seriously does 
not mean that we should no longer try to influence the future by making decisions 
about it, that we should passively accept whatever comes our way. And it does not 
mean we must instead make do with temporary visions (although this helps). It 
means, rather, that there is more to taking care of the future (acting responsibly 
towards it) than merely developing a vision (even a provisional one).  This is 
where the “logic” of emergence or deconstruction becomes helpful. This is because 
an emergentist understanding of process, which is not orientated towards control 
and closure (choosing what to do) but towards the invention of the new (putting 
things together differently), presents us with the possibility to think about the 
future in non-teleological terms.  
 Emergence can be understood as a kind of normative force in that it guides in a 
way that is non-arbitrary, based on the rules of the past, which is nevertheless non-
normative in that it exceeds the rules of the past. It does this by using the rules of 
the past in an experimental way to create something radically new, something 
which is beyond the rules, beyond what we can calculate as being possible. This is 
Derrida’s the “experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible” 
(1992, p. 41). I would argue that because it uses rules/norms to exceed rules/norms, 
the “logic” of emergence can therefore be understood as a kind of “non-normative 
normativity.” I would also argue that it is only through the “logic” of emergence, 
understood as the “experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible” 
that we are capable of “taking care of the future.” I do not mean to suggest, 
however, that experimenting with the possibility of the impossible is a new means 
of taking care of the future, one that should replace all the other forms. I would 
suggest, rather that this kind of care and responsibility for the future already 
inhabits the other understandings of care and responsibility for the future discussed 
in this essay, and fulfils their ethical requirements.  
 It certainly satisfies Jonas’s understanding of responsibility for the future for it 
ensures that the future “in its every ever-new, always unprecedented productions, 
which no knowledge of essence can predict” (Jonas 1984, p. 126) can still take 
place. It also puts in place a vision for the future (as I have argued, we cannot do 
without such, when making political decisions) albeit a radically new one, which 
means we are still taking an active interest in the future, choosing our future rather 
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than abandoning ourselves to the vicissitudes of fate. It also enables a form of 
politics which goes beyond the discourse of rational justification, which can only 
end in impasse or domination as the rational grounds for the justification of our 
political choices are swept away. 
 This solution therefore appears to “solve” the paradox of what it means to be 
responsible for the future. It does not, however, dispense with the notion of 
paradox itself, which is now shifted to a position inside the process of “taking care 
of the future.” Paradox now appears as the condition of possibility of taking care of 
the future instead of something that might get in the way of it.  
 One question that remains, however, which is of substantial importance. Where 
can this understanding of politics can actually take place? Where is there room for 
paradox per se? Where is the “democratic space,” with paradox at its heart, that 
allows people to engage with “the experience and experiment of the possibility of 
the impossible”? While Rancière (2010) and Mouffe (2005) argue that the kind of 
political interaction they describe must necessarily take place amongst “the 
people,” they also acknowledge that this kind of engagement is not yet taking place 
amongst “the people” (hence their theorising about it). It has not yet been taken up 
in a general sense. Moreover, to put in place a political regime which would 
demand this form of political interaction would be to do precisely what Rancière 
(2010) warns against: the implementation (enforcing) of such a politics would, in 
effect, remove freedom of choice and hence stifle the very possibility of the 
political. I believe at this point it is necessary to turn to education, for it may be 
that the only place in which an experimental engagement with the possibility of the 
impossible—or with “politics as paradox”—can take place is in the educational 
domain. 
Educational Democracy? 
I do not wish to suggest that education can teach people about this kind of politics, 
this kind of responsibility, this kind of “care for the future.” I would argue, instead, 
that education can be understood as (this form of) politics itself. To say this 
differently, I would argue that the political domain arises when we think in terms 
of the instrumental logic of complexity reduction (we must reduce the complexity 
of the present if we are to make decisions about the future, we have to choose,  but 
this creates differences which are political) while the educational domain arises 
when we think in terms of the emergentist “logic” of complexity. Education can be 
a place of paradox, a place of experimentation with the possibility of the 
impossible precisely because education does not have to make political decisions 
about the future.  
 While politics is, in principle, totalising, dividing, spatial (applying certain rules 
and not others to the future, no matter how temporary or contingent these may be), 
education can be in principle inventionalistic (using the interplay of otherness to 
arrive at new rules). Inventing new rules does not mean dropping all prior values 
and throwing away the lessons of the past. It means, rather, using the lessons of the 
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past to invent something radically new; something which might accompany us into 
the future (and also which might not). 
 I would argue, therefore, that when we are dealing with the political it may be 
helpful to employ the emergentist logic of complexity, as manifest in the realm of 
education, in conjunction with the instrumental logic of complexity reduction (the 
domain of the political proper). This is because, in the absence of education—
understood as the exposure to what is different, strange and other, such that new 
ways of doing things than are currently found in the world can actually be brought 
into being—politics becomes unjust as it is unable to rethink itself.  
 In this sense the logic of complexity can inform an “edu-political” theory that is 
based not on the moral convictions of some, but on the idea of an experiment with 
the possibility of the impossible (i.e., an experiment with that which cannot be 
conceived as a possibility). What we have, then, is an educational form of politics, 
or a political form of education. Whatever the case, it might go by the name of 
educational democracy (rather than, e.g., democratic education). 
 I believe this conception of education—which does justice not only to the 
complexity of education itself but also to the complexity of ethics and politics—
already exists in some poststructural writings about education (e.g., Ellsworth, 
1989; Lather, 1991, Britzman, 2006; Biesta, 2006; 2010, to name only a few). 
What does not yet exist is a general awareness of the importance and necessity of 
these understandings of education for the practice of “taking care of the future” in 
these complex cosmopolitan times. I hope this discussion may have gone some 
way towards making this case.  
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